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Abstract
We examine the stability of risk preferences across contexts involving di¤erent stakes. Using
data on households’ deductible choices in three property insurance coverages and their limit
choices in two liability insurance coverages, we assess the stability across the …ve contexts in
the ordinal ranking of the households’ willingness to bear risk. We …nd evidence of stability
across contexts involving stakes of the same magnitude, but not across contexts involving stakes
of very di¤erent magnitudes. Our results appear to be robust to heterogeneity in wealth and
access to credit, complicating seemingly ready explanations. (JEL D12, D81, G22)
Levon Barseghyan, Cornell University, 404 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14850 (lb247@cornell.edu); Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Georgetown University, 600 New Jersey Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001 (jct48@georgetown.edu); Lin
Xu, Cornell University, 404 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14850 (lx82@cornell.edu). We thank Colleen Carey, Francesca
Molinari, and Ted O’Donoghue for helpful comments.
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Introduction

Classical theories of risky choice posit that risk preferences are stable across decision contexts. The
stability hypothesis re‡ects a basic tenet of rational choice theory known as invariance (Tversky
and Kahneman 1986) or context independence (Hausman 2012). Context independence requires
that preferences over options be invariant to the aspects of the choice situation other than the
economic fundamentals, which in the case of risky options are the induced lotteries over outcomes.
Broadly speaking, the empirical literature on the stability hypothesis o¤ers two main …ndings.
On the one hand, studies that focus on the (strong) hypothesis of full stability— which usually take
a structural approach and examine the within-person consistency of model-based estimates of risk
aversion across domains— generally …nd that a person’s risk aversion di¤ers from one domain to
the next, suggesting that risk preferences are not perfectly stable across contexts (e.g., Barseghyan,
Prince, and Teitelbaum 2011). On the other hand, studies that focus on the (weak) hypothesis of
some stability— which usually take a model-free approach and examine the within-person correlation
of risk taking across domains— generally …nd that a person who takes on more risk in one context
tends to do so in other contexts as well, suggesting that risk preferences have a stable component
and are not entirely context dependent (e.g., Einav et al. 2012).
We provide new evidence on the stability hypothesis using data on households’coverage choices
in …ve insurance contexts. A key feature of our data is that three contexts involve small-stakes
choices while two involve large-stakes choices. The small-stakes choices are deductibles in three lines
of property insurance: auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils. The large-stakes
choices are limits in two lines of liability insurance: auto single limit and home personal liability.
We adopt the model-free approach of Einav et al. (2012) and assess the stability in ranking across
the …ve contexts of each household’s willingness to bear risk relative to its peers. Essentially, we
rank the coverage options by risk within each context and compute the pairwise rank correlations
among the households’choices across the …ve contexts. In our preferred baseline speci…cation, we
estimate the rank correlations controlling for variation across households in the price of coverage
and the risk of loss in each context.
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Consistent with prior results in the literature, we …nd that the households’small-stakes choices
are positively rank correlated. We also …nd that their large-stakes choices are positively rank
correlated. Strikingly, however, we …nd that the households’ small-stakes choices are negatively
rank correlated with their large-stakes choices. That is, we …nd that a household who takes on
more risk than its peers in small-stakes contexts tends to take on less risk than its peers in largestakes contexts, and vice versa, which does not support the stability hypothesis, even in its weak
form. Moreover, we provide evidence that this result is not driven by heterogeneity in wealth or
access to credit. As we argue below, this complicates seemingly ready explanations of our results.
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Related Literature

There are several previous empirical investigations of the stability hypothesis. We highlight a few
key studies in the economics literature,1 giving separate treatment to studies that use data on
market choices and those that rely on data from experiments and surveys.

2.1

Studies Using Market Data

In an early paper, Wolf and Pohlman (1983) compare the risk aversion of a dealer in U.S. government
securities as …rst measured by his assessments of hypothetical wealth gambles and then estimated
from his bid choices in Treasury bill auctions. The authors take a structural approach and assume
the dealer is an expected utility (EU) maximizer. They …nd that "the dealer was substantially more
risk averse in his bid choices than his assessments predicted" and conclude that people’s "degree
of risk aversion may depend on the speci…c context in which their choices are made" (p. 849).
Though pioneering, Wolf and Pohlman (1983) has two important limitations. First, it studies one person. Second, it compares hypothetical choices with market choices, which confounds
the question of stability with that of external validity. Overcoming these limitations, Barseghyan,
Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011) examine the deductible choices of 702 households across three insurance contexts: auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils. Assuming that households
1
Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011) and Galizzi, Miraldo, and Stavropoulou (2016) discuss additional
studies. A separate literature investigates the consistency of risk preference measures obtained from di¤erent elicitation methods employed in experiments and surveys. For a summary, see Galizzi, Machado, and Miniaci (2016).
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are EU maximizers, the authors obtain three interval estimates of each household’s risk aversion
based on its three choices. They …nd that these intervals intersect— implying that the choices can
be rationalized by the same degree of risk aversion— for only 23 percent of households, leading them
to reject the hypothesis of full stability.
Rejecting the hypothesis of full stability does not imply that risk preferences have no stable
component. Moreover, structural approaches to testing stability invariably comprise a joint test of
the stability hypothesis and the assumptions of the structural model. With these points in mind,
Einav et al. (2012) examine the workplace bene…ts choices made by 12,752 Alcoa employees in
six contexts: health insurance, drug insurance, dental insurance, short-term disability insurance,
long-term disability insurance, and 401(k) investments. The authors pursue a model-free approach
(which we adopt here) in which they rank by risk the options within each context and assess the
rank correlation of the employees’ choices across the six contexts. They …nd that an employee’s
choice in each context is positively rank correlated with her choice in every other context, with
stronger correlations across "closer" contexts (p. 2609), leading them to reject the hypothesis of
no stability and conclude that risk preferences have a context-invariant component.2
In the wake of this methodological shift, Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum (2016) explore
the connection between full stability under a structural approach and rank stability under a modelfree approach. Using data on the deductible choices of 3,629 households across the three insurance
contexts studied by Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011), the authors document two …ndings:
(i) the households’deductible choices are positively rank correlated, echoing the …nding of Einav
et al. (2012), and (ii) …ve in six households exhibit full stability under a rank-dependent EU model.
They then show that the fully stable households drive the rank correlations.
Our paper builds directly on Einav et al. (2012). Like them, we take a model-free approach and
examine rank stability across multiple contexts using data on market choices. The main distinction
between our papers is the degree to which the stakes vary across contexts. In the contexts we
study, the dollar values of the options range from the hundreds and thousands (in our small-stakes
contexts) to the hundreds of thousands and millions (in our large-stakes contexts). As we discuss
2

Einav et al. (2012) also pursue a structural approach that is conceptually similar to the approach in Barseghyan,
Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011). Under this approach, they …nd that for roughly 30 percent of employees all six choices
can be rationalized by the same degree of risk aversion.
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in Section 4.3, the dollar values of the options in Einav et al. (2012) range from the hundreds and
thousands (in three contexts) to the tens of thousands (in the others). It is this distinction that
reconciles our results. Both papers …nd evidence of rank stability across contexts involving stakes
of the same or near orders of magnitude, while ours also …nds evidence of rank instability across
contexts involving stakes of remote orders of magnitude.3

2.2

Studies Using Nonmarket Data

Anderson and Mellor (2009) compare the responses of laboratory subjects to a series of hypothetical
job gambles and a series of hypothetical inheritance gambles. The authors construct a categorical
measure of the subjects’ risk aversion based on the job gamble responses and then do the same
for the inheritance gamble responses. They …nd that 34 percent of subjects exhibit the same
degree of risk aversion across the two contexts and report a rank correlation of 0.175 between the
two measures.4 Dohmen et al. (2011) use survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
to compare respondents’ self-reported willingness to take risks across …ve contexts: car driving,
…nancial matters, sports and leisure, health, and career. The authors report that while the responses
"are not perfectly correlated across contexts, . . . the pairwise correlations are large, typically in the
neighborhood of 0.5," which they argue "is suggestive of a stable, underlying risk trait" (p. 537).
More recently, Ioannou and Sadeh (2016) compare the selections made by laboratory subjects from
a set of real monetary gambles and a set of real "environmental" gambles (where the payo¤s are
numbers of bee-friendly plants). The authors …nd that subjects "exhibit a higher degree of risk
aversion in the environmental domain relative to the monetary domain; that is, individuals tend
to be more reluctant to take on large gambles with environmental outcomes than with monetary
3
Collier et al. (2017) also study choices with remote stakes. Using data on households’deductibles and coverage
limits in ‡ood insurance, the authors structurally estimate the risk preferences implied by the two choices and …nd that
they di¤er. Because they take a structural approach, their paper relies on stronger modeling assumptions than ours.
Indeed, their estimation approach— parametric MLE of a random utility model— entails even stronger assumptions
than the partial identi…cation approach taken by Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011). In addition, the two
choices they study are made in the same context. We therefore view their paper as more in line with the related
literature on how risk aversion varies with stake size (e.g., Binswanger 1980; Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992; Holt
and Laury 2002; Fehr-Duda et al. 2010).
4
The job and inheritance gamble questions are taken from the Heath and Retirement Study (HRS). Barksy
et al. (1997) use the responses to the job gamble questions in the HRS to construct a measure of respondents’ risk
tolerance. They then present evidence that their measure predicts certain self-reported risky behaviors, "including
smoking, drinking, not having insurance, choosing risky employment, and holding risky assets" (p. 551).
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ones" (p. 31).5 In addition to using nonmarket data, these studies di¤er from ours in that they
either lack meaningful variation in stakes across contexts (e.g., Anderson and Mellor 2009; Ioannou
and Sadeh 2016) or they study general domains of risky behavior in which the stakes are neither
explicit nor well-de…ned (e.g., Barksy et al. 1997; Dohmen et al. 2011).

3

Data and Sample

The source of our data is a large U.S. property and casualty insurance company. Our dataset contains annual information on more than 400,000 households who purchased auto or home insurance
from the company between 1998 and 2007. The data contain all the information in the company’s
records regarding the households and their policies, including claims information.
We focus on three small-stakes choices and two large-stakes choices. The small-stakes choices
are deductibles in three lines of property coverage: auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home
all perils. Auto collision coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle caused by a collision with
another vehicle or object, without regard to fault. Auto comprehensive coverage pays for damage
to the insured vehicle from all other causes, without regard to fault. Home all perils coverage pays
for damage to the insured home from all causes, except those that are speci…cally excluded (e.g.,
‡ood). The deductible options range from $100 to $1,000 in auto collision, $50 to $1,000 in auto
comprehensive, and $100 to $5,000 in home all perils. The mean increment between options is $225
in auto collision, $190 in auto comprehensive, and $980 in home all perils.
The large-stakes choices are limits in two lines of liability coverage: auto single limit and home
personal liability. Auto single limit coverage pays for bodily injury or property damage to others
for which the insured driver is legally responsible. Home personal liability coverage pays for bodily
injury or property damage to others for which the insured homeowner is legally responsible. The
limit options range from $60,000 to $1,000,000 in auto single limit and $100,000 to $1,000,000 in
5

In another incentivized experiment, Choi et al. (2007) test within-subject consistency (assuming maximization
of a well-behaved concave utility function) across 50 risky portfolio choices. They …nd that while only 17 percent of
subjects exhibit perfect consistency (app. C), a "signi…cant majority" perform "only a bit worse" (pp. 1927-1928).
More to the point, the authors report (without providing details) that "some subjects" exhibit a "switching" pattern—
sometimes choosing extremely safe portfolios, sometimes choosing extremely risky portfolios, and sometimes chooisng
intermediate portfolios— wherein their choices are "individually consistent" with risk averse utility maximization but
"mutually inconsistent" with one another (pp. 1925 & 1936-1937).
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home personal liability. The mean increment between options is $188,000 in auto single limit and
$180,000 in home personal liability.
Our baseline sample comprises households who (i) purchased all three property coverages and
both liability coverages and (ii) …rst purchased each coverage within any six-month window during
the period from 2004 to 2007. The latter restriction helps avoid temporal issues, such as changes in
household characteristics or the economic environment. We consider only the households’coverage
choices at the time of …rst purchase. This helps ensure that we are working with active choices;
one might worry that households renew their policies without actively reassessing their coverage
options (Handel 2013). These restrictions yield a baseline sample of 2,690 households.
For each household in our baseline sample, we observe its deductible or limit choice (as the
case may be) in each coverage, as well as the pricing menu it faced in each coverage. According to
conversations with the company and an independent agent who sells company policies, the choice
environment is conducive to households making active and informed choices— there are no default
choices, the pricing menu is available to a household when it makes a choice, and a household must
choose a deductible or limit separately for each coverage.
Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics for the baseline sample. Table 1 reports demographic
characteristics and claim frequencies. Table 2 summarizes the coverage choices and pricing menus.
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4.1

Methods and Results
Empirical Strategy and Baseline Results

We adopt the model-free approach of Einav et al. (2012) and assess the stability in ranking across
contexts of each household’s willingness to bear risk relative to its peers. To begin, we rank the
options by risk within each context, ordering them from highest to lowest risk exposure. There
are …ve or six options in each context (see Table 2). The safest option is the lowest deductible in
property coverages and the highest limit in the liability coverages. We then compute the pairwise
Spearman rank correlations in the households’choices across the …ve contexts.

6

Because these rank correlations do not control for potentially important covariates, we also
examine the correlation structure of the residuals from a system of …ve equations:
2
(1)
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where yij denotes the rank-ordered choice of household i in context j,
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is a vector of context-

speci…c coe¢ cients, xi is a vector of household-speci…c covariates, and "ji is a household- and
context-speci…c residual. In theory, a household’s choices depend not only on its risk preferences
but also on the prices it faces and its risk pro…le. The baseline set of covariates (xi ), therefore,
includes controls for prices and risk. The price controls are log-transformed premiums for each
coverage assuming a $250 deductible or $200,000 limit, as the case may be.6 The risk controls are
expected annual claims under each coverage based on separate Poisson-gamma Bayesian credibility
models. By construction, the risk controls take into account both the systematic and idiosyncratic
components of a households’risk type. For further details, see the Online Appendix.
Following Einav et al. (2012), we estimate system (1) in two di¤erent ways. First, we treat it as
a multivariate ordered probit regression model and estimate it by maximum likelihood.7 Second,
we treat it as a multivariate linear regression model and estimate it by least squares. Because the
set of options in each context is discrete, the probit regression is our preferred speci…cation.
Table 3 reports the baseline results. Panel A shows the Spearman rank correlations. Panels
B and C display the estimated correlations from the probit and linear regressions, respectively.
Each panel tells the same story. Across all panels, the correlation between each pair of small-stakes
choices is positive, ranging from 0:26 to 0:70. Similarly, the correlation between the two largestakes choices is positive, ranging from 0:44 to 0:57. By contrast, however, the correlation between
every pairing of a small-stakes choice and a large-stakes choice is negative, ranging from
6

0:05 to

We do not include a price control for home personal liability because the premiums do not vary across households.
We estimate the system by performing bivariate ordered probit regressions on every pair of equations. In each
regression, we use the Huber/White/sandwich estimator to obtain robust standard errors.
7
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0:34. Overall, the baseline results suggest that the households exhibit a fairly stable degree of risk
aversion relative to their peers across contexts that involve stakes of the same order of magnitude.
At the same time, however, the results suggest that households who exhibit a higher degree of risk
aversion than their peers in small-stakes contexts tend to exhibit a lower degree of risk aversion
than their peers in large-stakes contexts, and vice versa.

4.2
4.2.1

Sensitivity Analysis
Umbrella Coverage

Twenty-six percent of the households in the baseline sample purchased umbrella liability coverage
from the company to supplement their auto single limit and home personal liability coverages. The
umbrella coverage options range from $1 million to $5 million in $1 million increments, and the
premium associated with each coverage option is the same for all households.
The baseline results disregard the households’umbrella choices. To explore whether this biases
our results, we treat households who purchased umbrella coverage as having chosen a new "highest
limit" option (i.e., a limit of unspeci…ed amount greater than $1,000,000) in auto single limit and
home personal liability, and we re-estimate (1) treating it as a system of ordered probits and
including the baseline set of controls.8
Table 4, panel A reports the results, which tell the same story as the baseline results. Indeed,
all but one of the pairwise correlations involving a liability insurance context are stronger than the
corresponding baseline correlations. The only exception is the correlation between home all perils
and home personal liability, which is slightly weaker than the corresponding baseline correlation.9
4.2.2

Wealth

Economists have long hypothesized that risk preferences depend on wealth (Friedman and Savage
1948; Pratt 1964; Arrow 1971). The standard assumption is that absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, which implies that, ceteris paribus, a household’s willingness to pay for insurance
8

We do not add a price control for umbrella coverage because the premiums do not vary across households.
As a further check, we also re-estimate (1), again treating it as a system of ordered probits and including the
baseline set of controls, on the subsample of 1,993 households who did not purchase umbrella coverage. Those results
also tell the same story as the baseline results.
9
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decreases with its wealth. See, for example, Pratt (1964, pp. 122-123): "Utility functions for which
[the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion] is decreasing are logical candidates to use when trying
to describe the behavior of people who, one feels, might generally pay less for insurance against a
given risk the greater their assets."
Our baseline analysis does not control for household wealth. To examine whether wealth e¤ects
may be driving our results, we add a control for wealth to the baseline set of controls and re-estimate
(1) treating it as a system of ordered probits. We do not directly observe a household’s wealth in
our data, but we do observe a plausible proxy: the insured value of the dwelling covered by its
homeowners policy ("home value"). Of course, we do not know the correlation between home value
and wealth in our data. However, according to combined extract data (1989-2016) from the Survey
of Consumer Finance, the correlation between home value and wealth is 0.47 (std. err. = 0.002).
Table 4, panel B reports the results. Each pairwise correlation is virtually identical to the
corresponding baseline correlation. It thus appears that wealth e¤ects are not driving our results.
4.2.3

Access to Credit

In theory, a household’s ability to borrow after a loss event can a¤ect its demand for insurance
(Handel, Hendel, and Whinston 2015; Ja¤e and Malani 2017). To investigate whether di¤erences
in access to credit may be driving our results, we add controls for households’insurance scores in
auto and home to the baseline set of controls and re-estimate (1) treating it as a system of ordered
probits. Insurance scores are akin to credit scores. Both are derived using the same …ve categories
of information contained in credit reports (payment history, level of indebtedness, length of credit
history, new credit and pursuit of new credit, and types of credit), though they di¤er somewhat
in how they weight these categories (Morris, Schwarcz, and Teitelbaum 2017). For this reason, we
believe that insurance score, like credit score, is a good proxy for a household’s access to credit.10
Table 4, panel C reports the results. Again, each pairwise correlation is virtually identical to
the corresponding baseline correlation. This suggests that di¤erences in access to credit are not
driving our results.11
10

There is ample evidence that credit score is a good proxy for access to credit (e.g., Baker 2017).
As a further check, we re-estimate (1), again treating it as a system of ordered probits, with controls for wealth
and insurance scores (and their interactions) added to the baseline set. Once again, the results tell the same story.
11

9

4.2.4

Choice Window

In the baseline sample, we restrict attention to households who, inter alia, purchased all …ve coverages within a six-month window. There are two opposing considerations in selecting a choice
window. On the one hand, a narrower window helps to avoid what Einav et al. (2012, p. 2611) call
"the problems of inferring preferences from ‘stale’choices," which they note "could be particularly
concerning if individuals might have made their choices . . . at di¤erent points in time." On the
other hand, a wider window helps to improve inference by increasing sample size.
We are not concerned that a six-month window is too narrow. Our baseline sample comprises
2,690 households, which we believe is su¢ ciently large to draw valid inferences. To address the
concern that a six-month window may be too wide, we re-estimate (1) on the subsample of 1,694
households who purchased all …ve coverages on the same day. As before, we treat (1) as a system
of ordered probits and include the baseline set of controls. Table 4, panel D reports the results.
They tell the same story as the baseline results. Indeed, all but two of the pairwise correlations
are stronger than the corresponding baseline correlations. The only exceptions are the pairwise
correlations between auto collision and home personal liability and between home all perils and
home personal liability, which are slightly weaker than baseline.

4.3

Comparison with Einav et al. (2012)

We close this section with a discussion comparing our results with those of Einav et al. (2012).
Using data on the workplace bene…ts choices of 12,752 Alcoa employees, Einav et al. (2012) pursue
the same model-free approach (which they develop) to assess the rank stability of the employees’
risk preferences across six contexts: health insurance, drug insurance, dental insurance, shortterm disability insurance, long-term disability insurance, and 401(k) investments. In their baseline
analysis, where they control for variation in bene…t menus, they …nd that an employee’s choice
in every context is positively rank correlated with its choice in every other context, implying that
employees who exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion than their peers in one context tend also
to do so in other contexts, and vice versa. They …nd very similar results when they add controls
for risk. The strongest pairwise correlations are between short- and long-term disability insurance
(0:76) and among health, drug, and dental insurance (ranging from 0:30 to 0:49). Somewhat weaker
10

are the correlations across the disability and medical insurance contexts (ranging from 0:21 to 0:26).
The weakest are between 401(k) investments and every other context (all below 0:05, including two
that are slightly negative but not statistically di¤erent from zero).12
In order to compare our results with those of Einav et al. (2012), we must classify their contexts
according to the magnitude of the stakes involved, applying the same criteria that we use to classify
our contexts. Recall that in our small-stakes contexts the values of the options and the inter-option
increments range in the hundreds and thousands dollars, whereas in our large-stakes contexts the
value of the options range in the hundreds of thousands and millions of dollars with inter-option
increments that range in the hundreds of thousands dollars.
For the reasons we detail in the Online Appendix, we conclude that none of the contexts in
Einav et al. (2012) involve large-stakes choices. Speci…cally, we conclude that three contexts—
health, drug, and dental insurance— involve small-stakes choices. In two contexts— short-term
disability insurance and 401(k) investments— we determine that the stakes range in the thousands
and tens of thousands of dollars but not the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and so we classify
them as moderate-stakes contexts. We also classify the remaining context— long-term disability
insurance— as involving moderate-stakes choices, though the reasons are less straightforward.13
Given these classi…cations, we see that our results and those of Einav et al. (2012) complement one another. We both …nd a pattern of positive pairwise correlations among small-stakes
choices. To this common result, Einav et al. (2012) add two …ndings: patterns of positive (or
at least non-negative) pairwise correlations among moderate-stake choices and across small- and
moderate-stakes choices. We also add two …ndings. The …rst is a pattern of positive pairwise
correlations among large-stakes choices, which taken together with the previous …ndings hints at
a stable component of risk preferences that operates across contexts involving stakes of the same
or near orders of magnitude. The second …nding that we add to the mix is our main contribution:
12

The quoted results are from Table 3B, panel A in Einav et al. (2012), which reports correlation estimates from
a system of ordered probits with controls for bene…t menus and risk.
13
We note that in an e¤ort to establish the comparability of the choices they study, Einav et al. (2012, p. 2616)
argue that "the incremental decisions across each domain are quite comparable in expected magnitude, . . . ranging
from several hundred to a few thousand dollars" (emphasis added). We do not disagree. But the fact remains that
the choices in their …rst three contexts di¤er categorically from the choices in their last three contexts in terms of the
absolute magnitude of the stakes involved. Morever, were we to classify choices according to the expected magnitudes
of the options (or inter-option increments), this arguably would be inconsistent with taking a model-free approach,
as it would presuppose a model that entails comparisons over expected values or utilities.
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a pattern of negative pairwise correlations across small- and large-stakes choices, which hints at a
lack of risk preference stability across contexts involving stakes of remote orders of magnitude.
There is another way to see how we build on Einav et al. (2012). Leaving 401(k) investments
aside for the moment, Einav et al. (2012) …nd (i) moderately positive correlations between contexts involving stakes of the same order of magnitude (small/small or moderate/moderate) and
(ii) weakly positive correlations between contexts involving stakes of adjacent orders of magnitude
(small/moderate). We corroborate the …rst …nding (for small/small) and extend it (to large/large)
and progressively add a third: (iii) weakly negative correlations between contexts involving stakes
of remote orders of magnitude (small/large). Returning to 401(k) investments, Einav et al. (2012)
acknowledge that this context is "the most di¢ cult to reconcile with any of the others" (p. 2636),
and they attribute the di¢ culty to a di¤erence in kind between investments and insurance. Our
results suggest an alternative explanation: employees may perceive 401(k) investments as a borderline large-stakes context, particularly if they view their allocation choice as applying to more than
just their current year’s contributions. This could explain the extremely weak correlations (more
or less zero) between 401(k) investments and every other context in Einav et al. (2012).

5

Discussion

We examine the hypothesis that risk preferences have a stable, context-invariant component using
data on households’ insurance choices. We study …ve insurance contexts, three involving smallstakes choices (deductibles) and two involving large-stakes choices (liability limits). Adopting the
model-free approach of Einav et al. (2012), we assess the extent to which the households’choices
display a stable ranking in their willingness to bear risk relative to their peers. While we …nd that
the households’choices re‡ect a stable ranking in risk taking across the three small-stakes choices
and across the two large-stakes choices, we also …nd that the households who take on more risk
than their peers in small-stakes contexts tend to take on less risk than their peers in large-stakes
contexts, and vice versa, which does not support the stability hypothesis.
What could explain our results? Three stories come readily to mind. None is unassailable,
however, and so each leaves open questions for future research.

12

The …rst is a story about relative risk aversion. Suppose that rich households choose higher
deductibles and higher liability limits than poor households. The intuition might be that rich households want insurance against large losses but not small losses (which they can self-insure at a lower
cost), whereas poor households want insurance against small losses but not large losses (because
you can’t get blood from a stone). This pattern of choices, which could explain our results, could
arise from a population of households with standard EU preferences and heterogeneous relative risk
aversion. Standard EU preferences feature a concave utility function that is de…ned over wealth
and exhibits DARA (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1971).14 Concavity implies a positive willingness to pay for
insurance. Let

denote this willingness. DARA implies that

decreases with wealth, which could

account for rich households choosing higher deductibles than poor households. If the utility function
also exhibits IRRA/CRRA/DRRA,15 then, ceteris paribus,

is increasing/constant/decreasing in

stakes (Menezes and Hanson 1970; Zeckhauser and Keeler 1970). Thus, the right kind of heterogeneity in relative risk aversion (e.g., rich households have IRRA and poor households have CRRA)
could account for rich households also choosing higher liability limits than poor households.
This story, while plausible, has at least two important counterpoints. The …rst is our analysis
in Section 4.2.2, which casts doubt on the possibility that wealth di¤erences are behind our results.
The second is the Rabin (2000) critique, which contends that EU theory is not a plausible model
of risk aversion across small- and large-stakes gambles.16
A second story features consumption commitments (i.e., spending obligations that are costly
to adjust). Suppose that some households have consumption commitments while others do not.
Chetty and Szeidl (2007) show that, within an EU framework, consumption commitments can
induce non-concavities in the utility function (cf. Friedman and Savage 1948; Markowitz 1952) that
increase risk aversion over small- and moderate-stakes gambles relative to large-stakes gambles.
Hence, the right kind of heterogeneity in consumption commitments (e.g., committed households
have lower risk aversion over large-stakes gambles than other households) could generate a pattern
14

In this paragraph, DARA stands for decreasing absolute risk aversion, and IRRA, CRRA, and DRRA stand for
increasing, constant, and decreasing relative risk aversion, respectively.
15
For instance, Saha’s (1993) expo-power utility function can exhibit DARA/IRRA or DARA/DRRA, while the
power utility function exhibits DARA/CRRA.
16
We note that the Rabin critique is not directly related to our main …nding of rank instability of risk preferences
across small- and large-stakes contexts.
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of choices in which committed households choose lower deductibles and lower liability limits than
other households, which could explain our results.
Again, this story, while plausible, is complicated by our sensitivity analysis. One implication
of Chetty and Szeidl’s (2007) theory is that consumption commitments "have a larger e¤ect on
risk aversion when agents are borrowing constrained" (p. 850). It follows that if heterogeneity
in consumption commitments were driving our results, we would expect them to be sensitive to
di¤erences in access to credit. Our analysis in Section 4.2.3, however, suggests they are not.17
Probability distortions headline a third possible story. Suppose that households’ subjective
beliefs (in a subjective EU model) or decision weights (in a rank-dependent EU model) do not
correspond to the objective risks. The right kind of heterogeneity in such beliefs or weights could
explain our results. For example, suppose that some households overweight loss probabilities in
large-stakes gambles but not small-stakes gambles, while other households overweight loss probabilities in small-stakes gambles but not large-stakes gambles. This could lead the former households to
choose higher deductibles and higher liability limits than the latter households. Alternatively, suppose that some households grossly overweight loss probabilities in small-stakes gambles and mildly
overweight them in large-stakes gambles, while other households do not overweight loss probabilities in any gambles (cf. Fehr-Duda et al. 2010).18 If in addition the former households are low risk
while the other households are high risk, this could lead the former to choose lower deductibles and
lower liability limits than the latter.
The issue with each version of this story is that it requires a peculiar heterogeneity structure.
(Indeed, we could level this criticism against the …rst two stories as well.) We are not aware of
any empirical or theoretical support for the kind of heterogeneity— including, in some versions, the
correlation between probability distortions and risk types— that is required by this story.
In future research it would be worthwhile to further probe these and other potential explanations
of our results and to explore whether similar results obtain in other comparable datasets.

17
Although Chetty and Szeidl (2007) adopt an EU framework, the non-concavities of the utility function insulate
their model from the Rabin critique.
18
Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) present evidence of this kind of pattern, but only for gambles in the gain domain. They
…nd no substantial di¤erence in stake-dependent probability weighting for gambles in the loss domain (like insurance).
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Table 1—Demographics and Claims
Auto policies
Driver 1 age (years)
Driver 1 female
Driver 1 single
Driver 1 married
Driver 2 indicator
Driver 3+ indicator
Vehicle 1 age (years)
Vehicle 2 indicator
Vehicle 3+ indicator
Insurance score
Collision claims (per annum)
Comprehensive claims (per annum)
Single limit claims (per annum)
Home policies
Home age (years)
Home value (thousands of dollars)
Insurance score
All perils claims (per annum)
Personal liability claims (per annum)

Mean

Std dev

5th pctl

95th pctl

57
0.38
0.20
0.58
0.43
0.03
5
0.48
0.03
788
0.089
0.024
0.085

15
0.49
0.40
0.49
0.50
0.16
3
0.50
0.17
106
0.286
0.125
0.277

32

80

1

11

602
0.000
0.000
0.000

957
0.600
0.000
0.597

44
213
733
0.058
0.002

31
155
100
0.192
0.027

2
90
562
0.000
0.000

105
430
888
0.451
0.000

Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for the baseline sample of 2,690 households.
Insurance scores in auto and home are based on information contained in credit reports.

Table 2—Choices and Prices
Share
(percentage)
Auto collision
$100
$200
$250
$500
$1,000
Auto comprehensive
$50
$100
$200
$250
$500
$1,000
Home all perils
$100
$250
$500
$1,000
$2,500
$5,000
Auto single limit
$60,000
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$500,000
$1,000,000
Home personal liability
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$1,000,000

Premium saving relative to safest option (dollars)
Mean
Std dev
5th pctl
95th pctl

1.0
15.2
11.6
63.8
8.3

40
80
134
174

23
46
77
100

15
31
52
67

84
168
281
365

5.1
4.7
34.9
11.2
39.3
4.8

45
67
74
104
127

32
48
53
75
91

15
23
26
36
43

93
140
155
217
264

0.3
22.3
54.9
21.0
1.3
0.3

186
248
330
391
463

156
207
275
326
386

83
110
146
176
206

403
529
694
820
1001

0.2
8.6
0.7
43.9
43.0
3.6

109
102
78
68
57

46
43
33
29
24

55
52
40
34
29

200
189
143
125
106

9.6
0.8
47.6
0.2
36.4
5.4

42
32
24
19
16

Notes: The table summarizes the coverage choices and pricing menus for the baseline sample of
2,690 households. Share is the percentage of households who chose a given option (deductible
or limit, as the case may be). The safest option is the lowest deductible in the property coverages
and the highest limit in the liability coverages.

Table 3—Baseline Results
Auto
collision
Panel A. Spearman rank correlations
Auto comprehensive
0.617
Home all perils
0.395
Auto single limit
-0.129
Home personal liability
-0.206

Auto
comprehensive

Home all
perils

Auto single
limit

0.383
-0.108
-0.219

-0.224
-0.339

0.563

Panel B. Correlation estimates from probit regression
Auto comprehensive
0.702
0.338
Home all perils
0.398
-0.056
Auto single limit
-0.104
Home personal liability
-0.149
-0.133

-0.134
-0.205

0.574

Panel C. Correlation estimates from linear regression
Auto comprehensive
0.552
Home all perils
0.290
0.263
Auto single limit
-0.077
-0.055
Home personal liability
-0.121
-0.114

-0.113
-0.163

0.437

Notes: The table provides results for the baseline sample of 2,690 households. Each
cell reports a pairwise correlation coefficient. For each correlation coefficient, the pvalue associated with a test of whether the coefficient is different from zero is less
than 0.01. The only exception is the correlation coefficient between auto
comprehensive and auto single limit in panel B, for which the associated p-value is
0.023. The probit and linear regressions include controls for prices and risk.

Table 4—Sensitivity Analysis
Auto
Auto
Home all
collision comprehensive
perils
Panel A. Correlation estimates accouting for umbrella choices
Auto comprehensive
0.702
0.338
Home all perils
0.398
-0.103
-0.135
Auto single limit
-0.134
-0.150
-0.176
Home personal liability
-0.165
Panel B. Correlation estimates with control for weath
Auto comprehensive
0.703
0.336
Home all perils
0.399
-0.060
Auto single limit
-0.106
Home personal liability
-0.151
-0.138

Auto single
limit

0.842

-0.144
-0.214

0.570

Panel C. Correlation estimates with controls for insurance scores
Auto comprehensive
0.702
Home all perils
0.398
0.338
Auto single limit
-0.105
-0.061
-0.136
Home personal liability
-0.148
-0.132
-0.204

0.576

Panel D. Correlation estimates with same-day choice window
Auto comprehensive
0.707
Home all perils
0.446
0.375
Auto single limit
-0.137
-0.103
-0.157
Home personal liability
-0.133
-0.159
-0.203

0.649

Notes: Panels A, B, and C provide results for the baseline sample of 2,690
households. Panel D provides results for the subsample of 1,694 households who
purchased all five coverages on the same day. Each cell reports a pairwise correlation
coefficient estimated from a system of ordered probits with controls for prices and
risk. In panel A, households who purchased umbrella coverage are treated as having
chosen a new "highest limit" option in both auto single limit and home personal
liability. In panel B, the probit regression includes an additional control for wealth. In
panel C, the probit regression includes additional controls for insurance scores in auto
and home. For each correlation coefficient, the p-value associated with a test of
whether the coefficient is different from zero is less than 0.01. The only exception is
the correlation coefficient between auto comprehensive and auto single limit in
panels B and C, for which the associated p-value is 0.015.

Online Appendix
to
Di¤erent Contexts, Di¤erent Risk Preferences?
Levon Barseghyan
Cornell University

Joshua C. Teitelbaum
Georgetown University

Lin Xu
Cornell University

Draft: June 20, 2018

1

Risk Controls

The risk controls are expected annual claims under each coverage based on separate Poisson-gamma
Bayesian credibility models. More speci…cally, we assume that household i’s claims under coverage
j in year t follow a Poisson distribution with arrival rate
variable and assume that ln

ijt

= z0ijt

j

+

ij ,where
ij )

We treat

ijt

as a latent random

zijt is a vector of observables,

j

is a vector of

coe¢ cients,

ij

variance

Utilizing our full dataset, we perform separate Poisson panel regressions with random

j.

is an iid error term, and exp(

ijt .

follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and

e¤ects to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of

j

and

j

for each coverage j. For each household

i in the baseline sample, we then calculate the expected number of claims bij for each coverage
j, conditional on the household’s ex ante characteristics zij and ex post claims experience

ij ,

as follows: bij = exp(z0ij b j )E(exp(

ij )

ij )j ij ),

where E(exp(

ij )j ij )

is calculated assuming exp(

follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance bj . Observe that by construction bij
takes into account both the systematic and idiosyncratic components of a households’risk type.1

2

Classi…cation of the Contexts in Einav et al. (2012)

In order to compare our results with those of Einav et al. (2012), we classify each of their contexts
according to the magnitude of the stakes involved. Moreover, we apply the same criteria to classify
We refer to the above-described model as a Bayesian credibity model because bij corresponds to the Bayesian
credibility premium in the actuarial literature (Denuit et al. 2007, ch. 3).
1

1

their contexts that we use to classify our contexts. Recall that in our small-stakes contexts the
values of the options and the inter-option increments range in the hundreds and thousands dollars,
whereas in our large-stakes contexts the value of the options range in the hundreds of thousands
and millions of dollars with inter-option increments that range in the hundreds of thousands dollars.
Based on their description of the coverage options in each context (Einav et al. 2012, pp. 26122616),2 we conclude that none of their contexts involve large-stakes choices. Three of their six
contexts— health, drug, and dental insurance— involve small-stakes choices. In health insurance,
employees e¤ectively choose among deductible options that range from zero to $3,000 (with a mean
inter-option increment of $750) for in-network care and from $500 to $6,000 (with a mean interoption increment of $1,375) for out-of-network care. In drug insurance, employees choose among
brand drug cost-sharing percentages that range from 30 percent to 50 percent for retail purchases
and from 20 percent to 40 percent for mail-order purchases. The mean of the resulting annual
drug claims is approximately $1,500 and the 95th percentile is approximately $5,500. In dental
insurance, employees e¤ectively choose between a maximum annual bene…t of $1,000 or $2,000.
In two of the three remaining contexts— short-term disability insurance and 401(k) investments—
the stakes range in the thousands and tens of thousands of dollars but not the hundreds of thousands
of dollars, and so we classify them as moderate-stakes contexts. In short-term disability insurance,
which replaces lost wages due to disability for up to six months, employees choose among wagereplacement rates that range from 60 percent to 100 percent.3 The mean annual wage of the
employees in their baseline sample is approximately $58,000 and the 95th percentile is approximately $114,000. At the mean claim duration, which Einav et al. (2012) report is approximately
two months, this suggests that the value of the bene…t ranges approximately from $5,800 to $9,700
for the average employee and does not exceed $19,000 for 95 percent of employees. Even at the
maximum claim duration, the value of the annual bene…t ranges approximately from $17,000 to
$29,000 for the average employee and does not exceed $57,000 for 95 percent of employees. In 401(k)
investments, contributing employees choose how to allocate their contributions among 13 di¤erent
funds whose prospective monthly returns range from
2

11:69 percent to 16.79 percent.4 The mean

See also pp. 4-5 in their Online Appendix.
In their Appendix Table A1, Einav et al. (2012) note that "sometimes" the wage-replacement rates in short-term
disability insurance range instead from 40 percent to 80 percent.
4
Einav et al. (2012) abstract from the employees decisions as to whether and how much to contribute, but rather
focus on how contributing employees choose to allocate their contributions across the funds. The range of monthly
3

2

annual contribution is approximately $4,600 and the maximum allowable is $18,000,5 with Alcoa
matching contributions up to six percent. This suggests that the stakes range approximately from
$2; 200 to $8,300 for the average contributor and from

$8; 500 to $32,400 for all contributors.

We also classify the remaining context— long-term disability insurance— as involving moderatestakes choices, though the classi…cation is less straightforward than in the other contexts. Alcoa’s
long-term disability plan replaces lost wages due to disability for durations longer than six-months,
subject to a six-month elimination period.6 Employees choose among three wage-replacement
rates: 50 percent, 60 percent, or 70 percent. At the mean claim duration, which Einav et al. (2012)
report is approximately one year,7 this suggests that the value of the bene…t ranges approximately
from $29,000 to $41,000 for the average employee and does not exceed $80,000 for 95 percent of
employees. At the maximum claim duration, which we assume could be as long as 45 years,8 the
present value of the bene…t could range into the hundred of thousands of dollars; but even in this
extreme case the present value of the inter-option increments would range in the tens of thousands
of dollars.9 All things considered, we conclude the stakes are best classi…ed as moderate.
returns is taken from Appendix Table A2 in Einav et al. (2012), which reports summary statistics of the funds’
monthly returns from August 2005 to December 2007.
5
Einav et al. (2012) state that the choices were made in 2004. We assume they re‡ect bene…t elections for 2005.
In 2005, the annual contribution limit was $14,000 for employees under age 50 and $18,000 for older employees.
6
The elimination period is the period of time between the onset of disability and the time at which the employee
is eligible to receive bene…ts.
7
Einav et al. (2012) note that their claims data are truncated at about two years, which suggests the mean claim
duration may be longer than one year. In a recent study of employer-provided long-term disability insurance, Autor,
Duggan, and Gruber (2014) report a mean claim duration of 1.55 years and a median of one year. Their sample
consists of approximately 8 million quarterly observations from nearly 10,000 unique employers, and their claims data
span eight years.
8
Einav et al. (2012) do not report the maximum claim duration (or the 95th percentile) in their data, nor do they
report the maximum bene…t period under Alcoa’s long-term disability plan. The maxmimum bene…t period under
many long-term disability plans is 2, 5, or 10 years, but under the most generous plans it runs until the employee’s
social securty full retirement age, which is 67 for employee’s born in 1960 or later. Assuming that Alcoa’s plan has
the most generous maximum bene…t period and that its youngest eligible employee is 22 years old, we arrive at the
assumption that the maximum claim duration could be as long as 45 years.
9
We are assuming annual discount rates well in excess of 10 percent, which is consistent with the preponderance of
the empirical evidence on time preferences (Frederick, Lowenstein, and O’Donohue 2002, pp. 377-380). For instance,
Warner and Pleeter (2001) estimate the personal discount rates of approximately 66,000 U.S. millitary personnel who
were o¤ered separation bene…ts that consisted of a choice between a lump sum or an annuity, where the break-even
discount rate was at least 17.5 percent. They …nd that "over half of the o¢ cers and over 90 percent of enlisted
personnel chose the lump-sum payment, implying that the vast majority of personnel had discount rates of at least 18
percent" (p. 33). Based on regression analysis, they report mean discount rates of between 10 percent and 19 percent
for o¢ cers and between 35 percent and 54 percent for enlisted personnel, depending on the model speci…cation (p.
48, tbl. 6). As Frederick, Lowenstein, and O’Donohue (2002, p. 385) note, this …eld study "is particularly compelling
in terms of credibility of reward delivery, magnitude of stakes, and number of subjects."
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